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SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR LAW

INTRODUCTION
DONALD W. HOAGLAND
of the Denver Bar

On March 28, 1953, a highly successful one-day institute on
labor law was held in Denver under the auspices of the Denver
Bar Association. It dealt almost entirely with the substantive aspects of unfair practices by labor organizations and by employers.
The three articles which follow are largely derived from lectures
that were delivered on that occasion and deal, respectively, with
unfair labor practices by employers, unfair labor practices by
labor organizations and secondary boycotts. These will present
in some detail the substantive legal limitations on the efforts of
management and of labor organizations to reach objectives which
can usually be gained only at the expense of some objective of
the other.
Of necessity these articles will omit large segments of the
general subject of labor-management relations, some of which are
easily separable but others of which are so closely related that
some mention of them at this point should provide useful background for the reading of the articles. In effect, the articles discuss the potential abuses of, and interferences with, the employee's
right to bargain freely with his employer through agents of his
own choosing. This omits any discussion of how this right was
acquired, and of how it is exercised in the absence of abuse or
interference.
From the birth of the first recognizable labor organization in
this country in 1827, until 1890, organized labor conducted a
series of experiments in technique which was regulated only by
judges applying common law methods to reach their results. It
is a familiar story that labor organizations were first viewed by
them as unlawful conspiracies. The first break in this attitude
occured in 1842, when a Massachusetts court held that Union
organizations were not illegal per se, but that their activities
must be examined on their merits. For fifty years the process of
examining their activities on their merits continued in the hands
of common law judges, and most labor partisans believed that
the movement fared very badly.
The first legislation of significance occurred near the turn of
the century. By an odd quirk of fate, statutes were passed in
1888 and in 1890 which stand, respectively, as the starting points
for two diametrically opposed lines of policy. In 1888 the Federal
Arbitration Act was passed in an effort to provide machinery for
the peaceful settlements of disputes in the railroad industry. This
machinery is the parent in legislative form of the National Labor
Relations Board. In 1890 the Sherman Act, which is rarely asso-
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ciated now with labor legislation, was passed, and provided the
opponents of the great Pullman strike four years later with a
powerful anti-union weapon. This was a bitter period, and some
of its bitterest episodes occurred in Cripple Creek, Leadville, Telluride, Victor and Independence, Colorado.
The next important development occurred in 1914. The use
of the Sherman Act against organized labor was bitterly opposed
by labor supporters, and in 1914 provisions were inserted in the
Clayton Act which were designed to eliminate Sherman Act injunctions against organized labor activities. The experience of
the railroad industry, starting from the Arbitration Act, was
producing new legislation and after several intermediate steps,
in 1926 the Railway Labor Act was passed, containing the announcement that employees subject to the Act had the right to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice.
The Act also provided for boards of adjustment and mediation;
its application was still limited, of course, to railroad employees.
Most labor leaders concluded that the actual gains produced
by these changes were insignificant. The Clayton Act was a great
disappointment to them, since the courts continued to assert jurisdiction over requests for injunctions based on the assertion that
irreparable harm to persons or property was threatened. Labor
turned more and more to the use of economic weapons and away
from substantive legislative action on the terms and conditions
of employment. By the early 1930's. the objective of labor appeared to be to clear the arena of all competing forces except
labor and management; to stay the hands of Federal judges and
to impose the minimum of regulation over the test of strength
between unions and management. The first important legislation
in this direction came in 1932. The Norris-LaGuardia Act in that
year removed jurisdiction from the Federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes except under special circumstances.
It extended protection to union activities by denying federal courts
the power to enjoin strikes, assemblies, efforts to publicize the
facts of the labor dispute and the very joining of union.
This was largely a negative measure, however, and in 1933
the first positive legislation of general application designed to
bring labor and management together at the bargaining table on
equal terms and with as little interference as possible, made its
appearance. This was contained in a portion of the National Industrial Recovery Act (Section 7A) which adopted the approach
of the Railway Labor Act and extended to all employees subject
to the Act the right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choice. The National Industrial Recovery Act
also adopted another Railway Labor Act device, namely, the labor
board. It established the National Labor Board which was intended to insure that the provisions of the Act were carried out
much as the National Railway Adjustment Board presided over
the enforcement of the rights of railroad employees under the
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Railway Labor Act. The NIRA, and the related Public Resolution No. 44, did not last very long, but within two months of the
declaration by the Supreme Court that NIRA was unconstitutional, the Congress passed, in July of 1935, the National Labor
Relations (Wagner) Act.
Although the constitutionality of this Act, which purported
to re'ach all employees whose labor disputes might affect commerce among the states, was in doubt until April of 1937, its
passage marks a key point in the acquisition by organized labor
of freedom to exert its economic power in bargaining with employers. There has never been any doubt about the potential economic power of organized labor; the overriding question has
always been how freely should it be permitted to be used. Nineteen thirty-five and the Wagner Act marked the high point of
labor's freedom to operate with a minimum of restraint.
There has, of course, never been unanimous feeling among
all groups in America that organized labor should be free to
operate without restriction. During the period 1935 to 1947, a
sufficient segment of the American public became convinced that
unions were operating with too little restraint that in 1947 a
strenuous revision of the National Labor Relations Act was undertaken, and the resulting law incorporated for the first time a
series of what are known as unfair labor practices by employees;
these, of course, are restrictions upon the freedom of organized
labor to use certain techniques labelled unfair in the test of
strength against management. As amended to date, the National
Labor Relations Act (which includes the Taft-Hartley LaborManagement Relations Act) states the substantive rules which
the three articles to follow will explain in detail. Whether they
represent the first stopping point on a reverse swing of the pendulum which is said to have swung in favor of labor to an increasingly dangerous extent for 30 years, or whether they constitute,
as many labor politicians during the 1952 political campaign announced they did, a "slave labor law", is a matter of individual
political choice.
A less controversial aspect of the subject, but an equally important one, is the matter of procedure. Now that organized labor
has acquired these rights, how are they exercised? The development of the National Labor Relations Board which the Wagner
Act created has been a controversial subject only in connection
with the policies pursued by the Board. There is little question
but that some such agency should be present in the labor-management relations picture to deal with abuses and interferences
by either party. Apart from its policies on such substantive matters, the manner in which it operates, its structure and administration, form the essential background and apparatus for the
performances of the principal parties to labor-management relations.
The beginning of all of the many potential contacts between
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organized labor and management is the organizing drive. The
National Labor Relations Board comes into this picture immediately, because it is the objective of labor organizations to become
recognized- and certified by the NLRB as the bargaining agent
for employee unit. Whenever an employer whose plant is unorganized is informed that a substantial number of his employees
desire to be represented by a bargaining agent, the employer
must either agree to bargain with the named agent (if he has no
question that the agent is in fact supported by the majority of
his employees) or he must submit the matter (or fequest that
it be submitted) to the National Labor Relations Board.
The Board (or the Regional Director) will either hold an
election or investigate the propriety of an election if a question
is raised as to its jurisdiction. There are three questions that
must be decided before an election can be held, and the Board
can decide them all. It must be determined that the employees
in question are subject to the Act, that a substantial number of
employees support the request for an election, and that the unit
for which an election is to be held is an appropriate unit for
bargaining purposes. The Board will decide these questions subject to judicial review. The first and third of them raise innumerable possibilities for disagreement and, particularly on the unit
question, the Board has broad discretion. Assuming that the necessary relation to commerce exists, and that the Board finds that
the proposed unit is appropriate, the members of the proposed
unit will be identified and an election held.
Agents of the Board will work closely on the scene with
management and union representatives to insure that each employee registers his private choice in the matter of union representation without interference. If a- majority of the employees
voting select the same representative, he will be certified as such.
If no majority opinion is found, run-off elections are held in which
"no-union" may be a candidate, depending on the number of votes
cast for that result in the election which failed to produce any
majority. Elections are decided by a majority of votes cast, but
no result will stand unless the Board feels that a sufficient number of members of the unit have voted.
This bare outline indicates not only how representation is
determined in the simplest cases, but also indicates the dominant
influence of the NLRB and its agents even in matters where no
abuse or interference prohibited by law is present, charged or
suspected. Against this outline, and during the operation of this
procedure and its ramifications the substantive rules elaborated
in the following articles operate.
This subject has always deserved attention and always will,
but it is particularly timely now because the Congress of the
United States is presently considering why and how it would
change the National Labor Relations Act to reflect the views of
a changed administration.
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EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
CHARLES A. GRAHAM and ARTHUR K. UNDERWOOD, JR.
- of the Denver Bar

Two important factors in labor-management relations have
significance necessary to an understanding of specific aspects of
labor law. First, the labor-management relation affects matters of
vital importance to those involved (property rights, personal rights
and actual survival in a business world), and this is so more than
with many other fields of law. The social and political overtones
of this fact add to the intensity and scope of the problem. Second,
labor law has developed from a beginning in which management
was dominant and unreasonable through a pendulum swing in
which labor has achieved a certain ascendancy. This has resulted
in bitter feelings on both sides. It has also resulted in important
psychological concepts on both sides which have distorted the real
problems involved.
As this pendulum swung, management was always thinking
in terms of an immediate past in which the rules were more favorable to management than thereafter. Consequently, management
developed an approach to labor relations in which the labor movement was seen as a gradual encroachment on a lawful and rightful
status quo. On the other hand, labor supporters felt that they had
had to wring from management rights which should have been
labor's anyway. Labor saw a pattern of continuing resistance to
the acceptance of labor rights which had already been written
into the law of the land.
One unfortunate effect of all this has been that management
and labor have both tended to become more and more aggressive,
often making somewhat unrealistic demands. Recently there has
been some indication that both of these attitudes have undergone
revision. Enough remains, however, to justify the statement that
one of the most important services a labor-management counsellor
can perform for his client, on either side of the table, is to acquaint him with the "facts of life" in labor law. When this is
done, much of the misunderstandings which produce unfair labor
practices will be dispelled. But until it is done, there will be an
insufficient appreciation of the real issues which are involved in
these cases.
Unfair labor practices can be understood only in the light of
the rights sought to be protected by the National Labor Relations
Act (U. S. Code, Title 29, Sections 151 et seq.). The Act protects
workers in organizing themselves into unions and bargaining concerning the terms of employment with employers. An unfair labor
practice by an employer is a violation of these rights. Administration of the Act has been conducted by the National Labor Relations Board which has exhaustively explored all phases of the
industrial relation to the end that the parties will really deal at
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arm's length as equals. It is in the wide ramifications of this
attempt to give labor equal strength and knowledge that some of
the misunderstanding about unfair labor practices has arisen.
Section 8(a) of the Act forbids the following employer conduct:
(1) Interference with, restraint or coercion of employees in
the exercise of their guaranteed rights.
(2) Domination of, interference with or financial or other
support of labor organizations.
(3) Discrimination in hire, tenure or condition of qmployment aimed at encouragement or discouragement of union
membership, except that the union shop is authorized,
consistent with state law. (Under a union shop an employee must join the union after employment and the
union must accept him or at least his initiation fee and
dues which qualify him for employment.)
(4) Discrimination against an employee for filing charges or
giving testimony under the Act.
(5) Refusal to bargain collectively with the employee representative, where duly selected.
It should be noted that the right of a worker to refrain from
union activity is also protected. This points up the fact that there
are really four entities with rights in this picture. Other than
the employer and the union, the individual employee and- the general public are also involved. The adjudication of all of these interests requires a series of compromises which constitute the
specific rules we are about to discuss.
Organizational drives produce many unfair labor practice
problems. The employees' right to organize and the employer's
right to run his business and control the use of his property come
into square conflict. The problems involve a related section of
the Act, 8 (c), which is the "free speech" provision. This section
declares that expressions of opinion containing no promise of
benefit or threat of reprisal neither constitute nor evidence an
unfair labor practice. We will begin the discussion with the organizational phase but remember that these principles apply throughout the relations.
Employers are responsible for the acts of supervisory personnel and, in some cases, the acts of employees, private citizens
or town officials where the employer initiates or encourages the
activities, and fails to disavow them publicly. The rules are not
the same as those of agency; they represent a realistic recognition by the Board of the devious ways in which an employer can
of others (3730).1
influence
theonbehavior
Spying
employees,
questioning employees as to union activities and other methods of getting information about the union
activities of employees constitute ULP (unfair labor practices).
1 Unless otherwise indicated, citations will be to Commerce Clearing House
Labor Law Reporter.
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Subterfuges such as hiring a detective to investigate "thefts" will
fail if thefts have not increased but labor organization has recently
been commenced. Polling employees or requiring applicants to
declare their union views are forbidden (3740).
The removal of a plant to another location, the "runaway
shop," is forbidden where it is motivated by an anti-union consideration. Of course a legitimate business purpose, if the real
motivation, is a sufficient excuse even though the incidental effect is
to discourage unionism (3795).
Of course any physical attack on the union organizer is forbidden (3780). In addition, threats, however subtle are ULP
(3770). In determining whether a statement by an employer is
protected by the free speech provision or whether it is an ULP,
the exact language used, the circumstances in which it was made,
and the employer's history of attitude toward unionism are important. Of course, if the statement is held to be a threat, the free
speech provision simply does not protect it (5000).
The employer may give his opinion that unionism has nothing to offer the employees and that the employees will be better
off by voting against the union. He may state his preference between unions. He may defend himself against union accusations.
He may do this verbally or in writing, though the latter is preferable even if the speech is read as it helps to avoid difficult questions as to just what was said (5000).
But if the context of the employer's remarks suggests that
the employer will use his economic power to make the employees
worse off if the union wins, or, conversely, to make the employees
better off if the union loses, then it is an ULP. Profanity and
vigorous, emotional forms of expression do not change the picture
unless the overall effect of the statement is changed (3770-5000).
The fact that the threat was ineffective is no defense
(3770.02). Conduct may also constitute a threat as, for instance,
a discriminatory discharge which, of course, will influence other
employees (3770.10). The threat may involve less than discharge,
such as the curtailment of privileges (3770.22), personal violence
(3770.40), or even isolation of an individual by work assignment
(3770.588), and it is still an ULP.
Of course the carrying out of threats is an ULP and this is
true whether the threat was communicated or not. Discharges,
layoffs, demotions, refusals to reinstate or to hire originally are
all ULP if made for anti-union reasons. A "constructive" discharge can occur by unfair job conditions causing an employee
to quit. As illustrative of the fact that the nut of the matter is
the employer's intent, note these results. If the employer thinks
an employee has been guilty of something that would justify discipline, if true, the discipline is not an ULP even though the employer is mistaken and the employee in actuality was not guilty
(2210.154). Further, if the employer's motivation was not anti-
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union, the discharge is not an ULP even though an incidental
effect is to discourage unionism (2210.16).
However, many difficult problems exist in determining whether
the reason for the employer's disciplinary action was anti-union
or not. The employer's mistaken belief as to whether or not the
employees' activity .was protected by the Act is no defense
(2210.153). An example of this difficulty is the question of
whether an employer can discharge an employee who refuses to
cross a picket line around some other employer's plant in the
course of his employment. The employer's right to have his work
performed and the employee's right to participate in concerted
activities for mutual protection meet head-on. Though the Board
is more favorable to the employee, the Court answer is probably
that the employee must cross the picket line during working hours
on pain of discharge (2210 notes .29, .30, .173, .435-.438, .64, .654).
Furthermore, the good faith of the employer in claiming the
discharge was "for cause" is often in question. Company rules
called into being or revived from disuse which was first applied
against union organizers are speedily rejected as legitimate bases
for discipline. Misconduct by employees, absenteeism, lateness,
dishonesty, insubordination, and similar matters are subjected
to close scrutiny by the Board before being allowed to sustain
discharges. The relative triviality or seriousness of the employee
conduct, the position of the employee in the union picture, the
employer's proper or anti-union history, as well as the equal or
discriminatory application of the applicable company rules are
all considered. Personal inadequacy of the dischargee, such as
incompetence, is usually rejected if first raised after unionism
entered the scene. Business recession or labor-saving devices are
other examples of excuses used.
An example of the refinements produced in developing labor
law is found in the problems associated with the attempts of the
employer to prohibit union solicitation on company time and premises and the so-called "captive audience" doctrine. An employer
may prevent solicitation during the employees' working hours
provided that the no-solicitation rule applies as well to other sorts
of solicitation, such as for social and charitable purposes
(3825.243). Giving the privilege to one union but not to another
is ULP (3825-2435). However, solicitation on the employer's
premises during the employees' free time may not be prevented
unless the employer can prove that his business justifies this restriction, as in2 retail sales departments where it would interfere
with business.
Rules against the distribution of literature fair better. Blanket
no-distribution rules are probably valid unless the physical setup
is such that distribution must be made on company premises to
be effective (3825). Rules against solicitation on company premises by non-employees are valid with the same exception.
2Bonwit Teller, 21 Labor Cases 67,025; 197 F. 2d 640.
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The "captive audience" doctrine is a ramification of the rule
that no-solicitation rules must be applied without discrimination.
If the employer forbids the union to use company premises for
solicitation, the employer cannot himself do so for a last-minute-3
before-election speech without giving the union a chance to reply.
It is unsettled whether or not the "equal 4 opportunity" to be given
the union must also be on company time.
The Board has taken the position that the captive audience
applies whether there is a flat no-solicitation rule or not and that
the employer must tender an "equal opportunity" to the union to
reply to an election speech by the employer. 5 In this case nine
days elapsed between the speech and the election so the employer
was not having the "last word" as he had in an earlier Board
case which reached the same result and was cited in the Seamprufe case.6 This view seems to be opposed
to the position of at
7
least the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The organizational drive is a means to an end-the establishment of the union as bargaining representative and the actual
bargaining of the terms and conditions of employment. After an
election and Board certification have determined the employees'
representative, this matter of selection is clear. But the problem
may arise before certification and rules have been developed governing this phase.
The employer's duty to bargain begins when the employees
have selected a bargaining representative by majority vote and
when that representative has demanded bargaining. When the
employer receives such a demand, he then has a duty to bargain
even though there has been no election or certification unless he
has a good faith doubt as to the majority status of the union, or
other representative. If the employer demands an election in
bad faith and in the face of clear proof (by membership cards,
for instance) that the union has a majority or where the Board
finds that the employer did so to gain time to undermine the union,
this is the ULP known as Refusal to Bargain (RTB hereinafter)
(3080).
When a union is elected and certified, this usually insures its
representation status for one year. However, where the employees
submit to the employer proof of their repudiation of the union
within the year, there is a split in the circuits as to the continuing
duty of the. employer to bargain with the union anyway (3080).
After the year is up, and if no contract is then in force, the employer can again refuse to bargain if he has a genuine doubt as
to the union's majority status but he cannot deliberately limit his
original contract with the union to one year if the motive is solely
I Bonwit

Teller, supra.

4 American Tube. Bending Company, 23 Labor Cases 67,671.

5Seamprufe, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. No. 17; Vol. 2, C.C.H. No. 12,251.
6Biltmore, 97 N.L.R.B. No. 128; C.C.H. 3825.077.
7
Bonwit Teller and American Tube Bending Company, supra.
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to test the union's strength again at the end of the certification
period.
As for bargaining itself, the following topics must be bargained (3020). The Act refers to " . . . rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment or other conditions . . . " and these have
been held to include the exceptional as well as the routine aspects.
Pensions, bonus plans and profit-sharing plans are included. The
employer's practices and procedures for discharge, suspension,
layoff, recall, seniority, promotion, demotion and discipline generally are bargainable. Vacations, holidays, leaves of absence,
sick leave must be bargained. Safety, sanitation, and health protection are legitimate topics. Grievances, both individual and
union, are proper. Union security is bargainable except that no
closed shop or preferential hiring agreement is legal. Also, Colorado law requires a three-fourths vote for any form of union
security and all such state limitations are recognized under the
Federal law. Checkoffs are an appropriate subject for bargaining,
and, in any case, each employee's consent must be obtained and
the checkoff can be irrevocable for no longer than one year or the
expiration of the contract, whichever is earlier. Of course the
interpretation of the contract, its term, and arbitration proceedings are bargainable too.
Despite the seemingly complete coverage of the above, there
are a number of topics which have been ruled not bargainable.
The corporate or other structure of the business and the size
and personnel of the official and supervisory force are solely management concerns. (However, it has been held that the number
of employees in the unit is a proper subject for union concern.)
The general business practices, including the sale or lease of the
business, choice of products to be handled, location of plants,
schedules of production and methods and processes of production
are for management alone. However, these are subject to the rule
against "runaway plants" and it has been held by the Board that
some schedules of production and some subcontracting of work
so affect employees' rights as to be bargainable.
At this point it might be mentioned that the duty to bargain
does not cease with the execution of a contract. Interpretation
of the contract and matters not covered in the contract and not
bargained away must be negotiated as they arise during the
course of the contract. Nor, as we shall see, does the duty to
bargain cease when negotiations fail and a strike occurs, though
it then becomes subject to some exceptions.
The duty is to bargain, not to reach an agreement. There is
nothing in the Act or the cases requiring either party to agree
to anything. A first view of this strange rule might lead one to
believe that a party could go through the motions looking as
though he were bargaining but without any real desire to agree.
However, the Board soon learned to see through such a proceeding. Various clues were used by the Board to show the intent not
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to bargain in good faith which is the test. Remember that the
whole picture is considered by the Board. Anti-union conduct
during organization is often used to find an employer's real intent.
A pattern of details can result in a Refusal to Bargain charge
though one or a few of the items might be insufficient alone.
Failure to answer the union's demand to bargain, failure to
have representatives available at reasonable times and places, and
unreasonable conditions of bargaining (such as, that the union
organize the employer's competitor first!) are RTB. The employer
cannot dictate who shall do the bargaining for the union. He
cannot require that they be employees and it has recently been
held that he cannot require that they sign non-Communist oaths.
(This is not to be confused with the requirement that the union
file certain non-Communist affidavits 2120).
The bargaining must be for all the employees in the unit and
not just the union members. The employer cannot bargain individually with his employees, though they are not union members,
if they are in the bargaining unit. Even grievances cannot be
handled between employer and employee without giving the- union
representative a chance to be present if the issue has to do with
the union contract.
Unilateral action by the employer on a bargainable topic during negotiations would obviously undercut the union and is RTB.
This is one reason why it is important to know what topics are
bargainable. There are exceptions to this, such as giving raises
to meet the threat of employees leaving for higher wages. But
the Board looks carefully at such excuses and finds them invalid
if the real motive was anti-union.
In the discussions themselves, the employer may be found to
have RTB if he rejects all union proposals and makes none in
return. On the other hand, the submission of ridiculous counterproposals may have the same effect! An example of this might
be a proposal by an employer to reduce wages after a union request to raise wages. Unless the employer has valid business
reasons for the decrease, it may be a RTB.
Changing positions frequently during negotiations, raising
new issues at the last minute, and similar conduct inconsistent
with intelligent bargaining may be evidence of RTB.
The employer mtst provide the union with data on bargainable topics to enable the union to bargain intelligently. Wage
rates, job classifications, rate ranges, merit ratings are examples
of the detailed data obtainable by the union. Where the employer
claims that he is financially unable to raise wages, he must give
the union data to support his claim although this may involve
opening his books to some extent.
The fact that a strike occurs does not terminate the duty to
bargain unless it was called in violation of an existing contract
or in violation of the Federal 60-day notice provision. When this
occurs, the employer may again bargain with his employees individually.
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The duty to bargain is also suspended by a genuine impasse
in negotiations. However, a change in conditions which might
break the impasse revives the duty. This may be due to external
events or to a change of position on the part of one of the parties.
Lockout or mass layoffs do not terminate the duty to bargain.
The availability of lockouts and layoffs as bargaining pressure
tactics similar to strikes is discussed elsewhere herein.
If an agreement is reached, the union is entitled to have the
result dignified.by a contract in writing rather than as a declaration of policy by the employer.
A scheme that suggested itself early to ingenious employers
was the establishment of a company-controlled union to keep the
rascals out. The Act prohibits this. The employer cannot interfere in the organization or function of the union in any of its
activities. No- money or other support can be contributed to the
union or its officials except that they may be paid while off the
job during actual bargaining. The employer cannot advance dues
to an employee to join a union. There can be no discrimination
between unions competing for recognition in the use of company
facilities, such as bulletin boards, or the enjoyment of company
privileges, such as solicitation on company time. The employer
must simply keep hands off unions.
Strikebreaking presents a number of special problems. The
theory is that in striking a union is merely applying valid and
legal pressures to persuade or compel the employer to grant concessions. The employer may not use his obvious advantages to
counter in an unfair manner.
There are two types of strikes with quite different rules. A
strike simply to bring pressure upon an employer as an aid to
bargaining is called an "economic strike." A strike in protest
over an ULP of an employer is called an "unfair labor practice
strike." An economic strike may become an unfair labor practice
strike if the employer is guilty of ULP during the pendency of
an economic strike.
ULP strikers are more favored than economic strikers. The
former are entitled to their jobs back, despite replacements, if
they request them within a reasonable time after the strike ends.
Economic strikers may not be discharged while they are still employees but they may be replaced. If the replacements are intended
to be permanent, the economic strikers are no longer employees
and are not entitled to their jobs after a strike. Both types of
strikers may be awarded back pay after an unconditional offer
to return to a job, to which the striker has a right to return, is
rejected. These rules are subject to the rules on discrimination
discussed above. For instance, in replacing economic strikers,
the employer need not follow any particular order but he cannot
replace only the active unionists. Also, if vacancies occur at a
later date, he cannot use union considerations to determine whom
to employ or re-employ. Although, in the absence of a contract,
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an employer need not respect seniority, it is a valid criterion for
employment.
Strikers may not be intimidated or threatened with the loss
of their jobs. However, the employer may notify economic strikers
that their jobs will be filled if they are not at work on a certain
date, though the employer has no duty to notify them before replacing them. The employer can persuade employees not on strike
to cross the picket line but he cannot discharge them if they won't
cross it. However, the employer can lay off non-striking employees
whose jobs are cut out by the strike or he can shut down entirely.
Strikers of either type may be discharged for illegal conduct
or for serious violence. Of course if the Board later decides that
the discharged employee was not guilty and the discharge was an
ULP, then all of the strikers may have become ULP strikers with
final rights of reinstatement.
Even though all of the employees who were union members
have been replaced, the union still represents the employees in
that unit. However, subject to the rule against representation
elections within one year of a certification or during an existing
contract, employees (not the employer) can independently petition
to decertify the union even though no other union is in the picture. The employer is guilty of ULP if he fosters this action.
Incidentally, the vote on such a petition raises interesting problems since only employees may vote. ULP strikers and unreplaced
economic strikers can vote. Also, economic strikers replaced by
temporary replacements can vote. Economic strikers discharged
because their jobs have been eliminated by changes in the employer's business operations may be able to vote depending on
the actual prospects for reemployment.
An unsettled question is whether an employer may use the
lockout as a pressure on the employees to aid the employer in
bargaining. The lockout is frequently justified on other grounds,
as necessary to prevent business loss. Examples of this are employers afraid to take orders which they might not be able to fill due
to a threatened strike, employers whose production facilities must
be shut down gradually and who fear a sudden strike, and employers afraid of loss of spoilable inventory in the event of a
threatened strike. However, the Board appears to take the position that a lockout solely for pressure purposes is ULP. But there
is language in court cases to the effect that the Act intended strikes
and lockouts to be
used equally by each side. The final word has
8
not been spoken.
The remedies of the Board (3840, 5600, 4700) include reinstatement of employees unfairly discharged, demoted, etc., back
pay to such employees and to strikers who have been unlawfully
refused reinstatements, cease and desist orders against ULP, dis'See Morand Bros., 20 Labor Cases 66,453 and 23 Labor Cases 67,624;
Leonard et al, 21 Labor Cases 66,997 and 23 Labor Cases 67,689. The Board
cases are cited at 4090.
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establishment of a company-dominated union, and usually a public retraction or promise of good behavior by the employer. A
strong incentive for employers to avoid ULP is that a pattern
of them may create a poor labor history when an important matter gets before the Board.
An employee with a final right of reinstatement gets his job
whether a replacement has been hired or not. However, if the job
no longer exists due to a change in business operations, a similar
position or other equitable solution will be reached. The fact that
the employee has taken another job pending the decision on his
case will not prevent reinstatement if he wants it. Strikers must
unconditionally request reinstatement as a condition precedent to
their right, unless the employer's conduct indicates it would be
futile.
Back pay awards may not include pay during an unnecessary
delay by the employee in filing charges and do not include earnings elsewhere or pay while the employee was unavailable for
work or while the work was unavailable as, for instance, during
a legitimate plant shutdown.
These rules represent compromises between the ownership
and management rights of the employers and the organization and
bargaining rights of the employees. This field of law is still developing. Broad trends as well as details are subject to change. Economic, political and even social pressures are soon reflected in the
labor law. The summary we have presented above is but a momentuary piture
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FELLOWSHIP COMMITTEE
With a thousand members, the Denver Bar Association is no
longer the small, friendly organization in which all members are
personally known to each other such as it once was not so long
ago. For many years the Association has maintained a Fellowship
Committee which arranges for visits to members who are ill and
for proper memorials by the Association when any member crosses
the final bar. Such things we still consider important and we
hope that the Association will never become so large that they
become neglected or be submerged in the press of our more
material activities.
Sometimes it is with a shock that we learn of the death of
one of our brothers at the bar many weeks after he has been
laid to rest or learn of the serious illness of a colleague only after
he has returned to his usual routines. Such happenings are inevitable in an organization of such a size but they are still regarded as lamentable. We ask that all Denver members recall
the existence of the Fellowship Committee when they learn of
the death or serious illness of one of our colleagues and notify
either the Secretary of the Bar Association or Mr. Floyd Walpole,
chairman of the Fellowship Committee.
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UNION PRACTICES PROHIBITED BY THE
FEDERAL AND STATE LABOR ACTS
WAYNE D. WILLIAMS
of the Denver Bar

This discussion deals briefly with federal and state jurisdiction over labor disputes, with union responsibility in unfair labor
practice cases, and with assorted unfair labor practices under
state and federal law, prominently, restraint, coercion, discrimination, and feather-bedding.
JURISDICTION OVER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

The principle of federal supremacy suggests that the problem
of jurisdiction over unfair labor practices ought to be approached
by determining the scope of the federal law, and in-that process
finding out what remains for control by the states.
The Taft-Hartley -Act was meant to apply the full reach of
the federal commerce power, and it gives the national Board jurisdiction over all unfair labor practices "affecting commerce."
Nevertheless, to avoid taking the time of the Board to hear
matters essentially local in nature, the Board, on October 3, 1950,
announced that in general it will act only in cases where the dollar
volume of interstate business done exceeds any of certain specified
amounts, depending upon the kinds of transactions measured;
and in cases involving public utilities, transit companies, instrumentalities of commerce, multi-state and national defense enterprises.' These requirements are not limitations upon the power
of the Board, but rather are guides which the Board will usually
observe in determining whether to exercise, its jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Board may take jurisdiction of a particular
case which falls outside the field described by these standards,
and the court may require the Board to do so, where the court
finds that the effect upon commerce2 of the activity complained of
in such a case is in fact substantial.
In addition to the powers of regulation which the states have
never surrendered over "local" commerce, whatever that now may
mean, it appears that the courts are marking out a few areas of
labor strife in which the states have jurisdiction concurrently
with the federal government.
For example, the U. S. Supreme Court has upheld the right
of a state, even in disputes affecting interstate commerce, to prohibit new labor techniques not protected under Taft-Hartley, at
least where injury to property and intimidation of employees are
present, and the court has explicitly reserved the question of the
'C.C.H. Labor Laic Reporter. p. 1615.
2 N. L.. R. B. v. Kobritz, 193 F. 2d 8
(1st Cir. 1951);
Association v. N. L. R. B., 193 F. 2d 833 (7th Cir., 1952).

Joliet Contractors
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power of the states to act when a labor dispute creates a real
local emergency. In addition, several state courts have asserted
jurisdiction to enjoin secondary boycotts in interstate as well as
local commerce, and state courts have taken jurisdiction of injunction suits for violation of the collective bargaining agreement,
which is not an unfair labor practice under Taft-Hartley. In two
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in February,
1953, it was held that Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction to enjoin
picketing which constituted an unfair labor practice under TaftHartley (picketing to force employer discrimination), but did
have jurisdiction to entertain a dispute involving
picketing which
3
Taft-Hartley neither protected nor prohibited.
In general, however, the matters of selection and certification
of bargaining units and representatives, the right to strike for
which Taft-Hartley recognizes as legitimate, and the regulation
of activities which are made unfair labor practices in Taft-Hartley,
are all withdrawn from state jurisdiction so far as the federal
commerce power extends. Thus, a state statute requiring a majority vote as prerequisite to a strike, requiring compulsory arbitration of all labor disputes involving public utilities, or authorizing state action in discrimination cases, is invalid when
applied
4
by a state to a dispute affecting interstate commerce.
The question of state and federal jurisdiction over labor disputes deserves a great deal more time than we are able to give it,
but perhaps the foregoing discussion at least suggests the problems that are encountered.
UNION RESPONSIBILITY

We come next to the question of the commission of unfair
labor practices on labor's side, and the principles for determining
responsibility for such practices. The Colorado statute provides
that an unfair labor practice may be committed by any employee.
Taft-Hartley is much more restrictive, and the unfair labor practices named in the federal act can be committed only by "a labor
organization or its agents." Accordingly, some attention must be
given to the principles from which the existence of an agency for
a labor organization is determined.
The federal act provides that in determining the matter of
agency "the question of whether the specific acts performed were
actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." This provision was intended to substitute common law principles of agency for the declaration in the Norris-LaGuardia Act
that unions could not be held responsible for the acts of their
officers and members without actual participation, authorization
or ratification after knowledge of the acts complained of.
3 Garner,
et al v. Teamsters' Union, 373 Pa. 19, 94 A. 2d 893 (1953);
American Brake Shoe Co. v. District Lodge 9, International Association of Ma-

chinists, 373 Pa. 164, 96 A. 2d 884 (1953).

4 For authorities in support of the above statements relative to jurisdiction,
and a good, detailed consideration of the subject, see note, "Federal and State

Jurisdiction over Labor Relations," 53 C.L.R. 258 (1953).

Aug., 1953

DICTA

In applying the new standard, the federal Board has held a
union responsible for acts of intimidation occurring in connection
with picketing, when instigated by union officials who had been
authorized to direct lawful picketing activities, for threats made
by the members of a union strike committee, and for coercion of
non-union members to join the union exerted by one holding general authority to solicit union membership. 5 The Board has, however, indicated that union membership alone is not sufficient to
create an agency, 6 and has held that a union which aided in establishing a picket line was not responsible for the acts of some of
the pickets who followed an employee away from the picket line
and coerced him respecting the union's objectives.7 In the case
last mentioned, the Board pointed out that the activity of the
picket had not been expressly authorized, and the union had not
established any pattern of unlawfully coercive acts which would
constitute implied authorization of the actions of the pickets.
Under what circumstances can the principle of respondeat
superior reach beyond the local union to the international or parent body? The cases upon this question do not afford a precise
guide. The mere affiliation of the local organization as a member
of the parent body has been held not to be a sufficient basis for
involving the responsibility of the latter, but if the parent organization actually undertakes to control the handling of a particular
dispute, especially through one of its own officials on the scene,
or finances it, there is likelihood that the Board will find international organization responsible in addition to the local union.8
CERTAIN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES CONSIDERED

A comparison of the unfair labor practice provisions of the
Colorado act with Taft-Hartley shows that the Colorado act is
considerably broader than the federal act, and designates as unfair labor practices a number of activities which Taft-Hartley
omits. Thus, the Colorado act makes it an unfair labor practice
to violate any collective bargaining agreement, or to refuse to
accept the final judgment of any tribunal having jurisdiction over
employment relations, or to commit any crime or misdemeanor
in connection with any controversy as to employment relations.
Most of the remaining activities on labor's side which are
rendered unfair labor practices by the Colorado act have some
counterpart in Taft-Hartley, and will be noted as we discuss the
practices prohibited by Taft-Hartley.
RESTRAINT AND COERCION

The first of the practices prohibited by Taft-Hartley is specified in Section 8(b) (1) of the federal act, and consists of restrain5Perry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225 (1948); International Longshoremen's
Union, 79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948).
OInternational Longshoremen's Union, supra, n. 5.
'Western, Inc., 93 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951).
'International Longshoremen's Union, supra, n. 5, and see note, "Union
Responsibility for Acts of Officers," 49 C.L.R. 384 (1949).
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ing or coercing employees in their rights to participate in or
refrain from organizing, collective bargaining, and other concerted activities for mutual aid or protection, or restraining or
coercing an employer in the selection of his own bargaining or
grievance committee representatives. A proviso in the subsection
preserves the right of unions to prescribe their own rules with
respect to acquiring or retaining union membership. The effect
of this proviso is that the union may deny membership to any
employee upon any ground, except failure to pay an excessive or
discriminatory initiation fee when there is in force a valid contract with the employer requiring union membership.
The real question under Section 8(b) (1) of the federal act
is what is meant by restraint or coercion? Clearly, any overt
violence forcing or causing employees affected by a particular
dispute to stay away from their employment or to join the union
amounts to restraint or coercion within the meaning of the act.
Three matters involving more doubtful questions of restraint
or coercion must be considered. The'first of these is whether mere
words alone can ever amount to restraint or coercion. The most
obvious case for responsibility is a threat of violence or injury
to person or property, and it has repeatedly been held that such
a threat is an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the
section. But how about the statement, "Boss, I want you to fire
those 2 men over there," when made by a union agent? If the
firing would be discriminatory within the meaning of the act, the
mere statement would probably be held to be coercive of the employees mentioned.9 The mere existence of an illegal closed shop
contract to which the union is a party has been held to restrain
employees in the exercise of their right not to join the union, even
though the restraint was not applied to any particular employees
or applicants for employment."'
Apart from words which are threats of violence, or which
constitute an attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
his employees unlawfully, mere speech does not constitute restraint
or coercion within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1). Thus in the
case of Western, Inc., already cited, it was held that peaceful
picketing during a strike which was called to enforce a secondary
boycott did not constitute restraint or coercion, even though the
purpose of the strike was unlawful.
Nor does mere name calling or vocally expressed resentment
constitute restraint or coercion. For pickets to call working employees "skunks," "rats" and the like is not a violation of the act.
Similarly, the threats "I'll get you" and "I know where you live,"
have been held to be too vague to constitute coercion under the
act, but "You'd better watch out because there may be trouble
later" was held coercive. 1
'Cf. N. L. R. B. v. Jarka Corp., 198 F. 2d 618 (3d Cir., 1952).
'"Jandel Furs, 100 N.L.R.B. No. 234 (1952).
" Perry Norvell Co., supra, n. 5; United Furniture Workers, 81 N.L.R.B.
886 (1949); United Mine Workers, 90 N.L.R.B. 436 (1950).
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The second matter deserving special consideration arises from
the fact that the words "restrain" and "coerce" imply that some
result in the behavior of employees or of an employer must occur
before restraint or coercion can be found to exist. Neither the
Board nor the courts, however, have taken this view. Instead,
and apparently on the basis of cases which arose under the Wagner Act, they have extended the act to hold that mere attempts at
restraint or coercion are prohibited by Section 8(b) (1). Thus,
where a union agent threatened an employee with injury if he
continued to work, the union was held to have violated Section
8(b) (1), even though the employee disregarded the threat and
continued to work. 12 Similarly, in the case of the illegal closed
shop contract mentioned, restraint of employees or applicants for
employment was found to exist even 13though no move had been
made to apply or enforce the contract.
Thirdly, it should be noted that it is restraint or coercion of
employees which Section 8 (b) (1) (A) prohibits. Notwithstanding
this use of the plural, "employees," it has been held that restraint or
coercion of a single employee violates the section, but this has
been done without any specific
consideration of the fact that the
14
word is plural in the act.
Suppose threats of violence are made to company officials
who are not employees within the meaning of the act. May such
threats amount to coercion of employees within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (1)? In the United Furniture Workers of America
case, the Board held that where union agents carrying clubs seized
a foreman by the arm saying, "No one goes in this morning," and
the occurrence was witnessed by employees, the employees had
been coerced respecting their rights in violation of Sction 8 (b) (1),
because they might reasonably consider that similar threats would
be made to them if they attempted to enter the plant.' 5
The Colorado act uses much the same terms as the federal
act in connection with restraint or coercion, and uses the singular,
"employee," instead of "employees," in describing restraint or
coercion. In addition, the Colorado act specifically names as unfair labor practives many coercive practices, such as mass picketing, intimidation, and sabotage.
CAUSING EMPLOYER TO DISCRIMINATE

The next unfair labor practice to be described is found in
Section 8(b) (2) of the Taft-Hartley Act, and consists of causing
or attempting to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee. The Colorado act contains a similar provision.
Employer discrimination against employees, under Section
"Progressive

Mine Workers v. N. L. R. B., 187 F. 2d 298 (7th Cir., 1951).
Mine Workers, supra, n. 11.
" N. L. R. B. v. Kingston Cake Co., 191 F. 2d 563 (3rd Cir., 1951); N. L.
R. B. v. United Construction Workers, 198 F. 2d 391 (4th Cir., 1952); Acme
Mattress Co., 91 N. L. R. B. 1010 (1950).

"United

. " Cited sitpra, a. 11.
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8(a) (3) of the act, is discussed in detail in another article in
this issue, and there is no need to extend that discussion here.
On the labor side, the unfair labor practice is to cause or attempt
to cause an employer to make such a discrimination.
The question of particular interest here is, what meaning
shall be given to the phrase "cause or attempt to cause?" During
the course of Taft-Hartley through the Congress this phrase was
"persuade or attempt to persuade." The conference report substituted the present phrase because, as Senator Taft explained, a
prohibition of mere persuasion would be inconsistent with the
free speech guarantees of the act. In practice, however, the phrase
"cause or attempt to cause" has been construed as if the section
still read, "persuade or attempt to persuade." Thus, peaceful
picketing, an unenforced closed shop contract, or even a mere
request for discharge of an employee have been held to constitute
attempts to cause employer discrimination. 6
Where a valid union shop contract is in existence the union
may, of course, bring about the discharge of an employee for
failure to pay valid dues or initiation fees without running counter
to the act. Failure to pay a fine imposed by the union, however,
is not a valid basis for requesting the discharge of an employee,
although the union might lawfully terminate the employee's union
membership for failure to pay the fine.
One further matter of special concern to unions in connection
with Section 8 (b) (2) practices is whether the section leaves them
any methods by which an employer may be encouraged to observe
the union's apprenticeship, experience or skill standards in the
employment of workmen. The unions have attempted to approach
this problem through the inclusion of provisions in the collective
bargaining agreement requiring the employer to notify the union
of any job vacancies as they occur, or providing for the establishment of a joint apprenticeship committee composed of representatives of the union and of the employer, or for the giving of competency tests to all applicants for specific employments. Any of
these provisions in a collective bargaining agreement is probably
lawful, so long as neither by the agreement nor by practices followed under the agreement is any discrimination
made between
17
members and non-members of the union. '
REFUSAL TO BARGAIN

Section 8(b) (3) of Taft-Hartley makes it an unfair labor
practice for the union or its agent to refuse to bargain collectively.
This subject, also, is discussed elsewhere in this issue, and I will
simply aftempt to fill in a few matters which arise particularly
on labor's side of the bargaining table.
,.Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 90 N.L.R.B. 1768
(1950), enforcement granted, 192 F. 2d 577 (10th Cir., 1951); N. L. R. B. v.
Jarka Corp., supra, n. 9.
"Compare, Evans v. International Typographical Union, 81 F.S. 675 (1948).
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The question of refusal to bargain comes up at some stage
of almost every contract negotiation, and the various demands and
policies which form the subjects of collective bargaining are too
numerous to mention. Generally speaking, however, any demand
by the union for a contract provision which the employer cannot
legally grant, or refusal to make any agreement at all, constitutes
a refusal to bargain on the part of the union.
Once the contract is made, bargaining is required upon questions of its application and interpretation, but Taft-Hartley relieves the employer of the duty to bargain concerning modifications
in an existing agreement until sixty (66) days from its expiration, at which time the union may serve a notice of proposed termination or modification of the contract, and initiate bargaining upon
the subject of a new contract as provided in Section 8 (d).
The act also relieves the employer of the duty, during the life
of a contract, to discuss matters bargained for in the negotiations
but not incorporated in the contract.
Unlike the Colorado act, Taft-Hartley does not define violations of a collective bargaining agreement to be unfair labor practices, although a right to sue for damages for the violation is
conferred, and a strike for modification or termination of a contract in force is a refusal to bargain.' 8 A proposal that breach of
the collective bargaining agreement be made an unfair labor practice was rejected by the Congress.
The Colorado act does not render mere refusal to bargain an
unfair labor practice, but does provide that violation of a collective bargaining agreement, and striking without giving the strike
notice required by the act, are both unfair labor practices.
SECONDARY BOYCOTTS
Section 8 (b) (4) of Taft-Hartley is discussed in Mr. Hornbein's article elsewhere in this issue.
REQUIRING EXCESSIVE OR DISCRIMINATORY FEES
Section 8(b) (5) renders it an unfair labor practice for the
union or its agents, when there is a lawful union security contract
in force, to exact initiation fees which the Board finds excessive
or discriminatory. This section is self-explanatory. The Colorado
act contains no matching provision concerning excessive or discriminatory fees.
FEATHER-BEDDING
The final unfair labor practice specified in Taft-Hartley is
feather-bedding. Section 8(b) (6) of the act makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union or its agents "to cause or attempt to
cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver
any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction,
for services which are not performed or not to be performed."
We have already considered the meaning of the phrase "to
s Section 8(d), Taft-Hartley Act.
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-ause or attempt to cause" in connection with employer discriminations, and the phrase probably carries the same meaning in
connection with feather-bedditg.
What is, then, an exaction for services which are not performed or not to be performed? This question was the subject of
two very interesting cases decided recently by the U. S. Supreme
Court. Both of the majority opinions were written by Justice
Burton. The Chief Justice and Justice Clark dissented in both
cases, and they were joined in one case by Justice Douglas and
in the other by Justice Jackson. The American Newspaper Publishers Association case 19 came to the Court through the 7th Circuit upon an original complaint before the NLRB, charging that
a union practice of insisting that newspaper publishers pay typographers for reproducing advertising type, duplicating the asbestos mdts from which advertising is customarily printed, constituted an unfair labor practice under the feather-bedding provision of Taft-Hartley.
In the other case, the Gamble Enterprises 20 case, a practice
of the musicians' union was involved.
Prior to Taft-Hartley a local theatre in Ohio had paid the
minimum union wage to a local band composed of members of
the union every time a traveling or "name" band played at the
theatre, but the local musicians played no music. After TaftHartley, the union first demanded that the theatre manager pay
a local band to be in the pit while the "name" band played from
the stage of the theatre, the local musicians to play overtures,
intermissions, and "chasers." The employer declined to do this,
and the union refused to allow the "name" band to be scheduled.
Later, the union offered to withdraw its objection to traveling
band appearances if the theatre would guarantee to pay the local
musicians to play at the theatre on a number of unspecified occasions in proportion to the number of traveling band appearances
at the theatre. This offer was also refused, and a complaint by
the theatre before the NLRB resulted.
In both of these cases the Supreme Court held that no violation of Taft-Hartley had been committed by the union, and the
basis of the decisions was that each of the union practices questioned called for the performance of some service by the members
of the union. In reaching this result, the court examined very
fully, and sets forth in detail in the American Newspaper Publishers opinion, the legislative history of this provision of TaftHartley and concluded,
However desirable the elimination of all industrial
featherbedding practices may have appeared to Congress,
the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act .
demonstrates that when the legislation was put in final
"American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. N. L. R. B - ..... U
U.S ........- 73
S.Ct. 552 (1953).
" N. L. R. B. v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc.. ...... U. ....... 73 S.Ct. 560 (1953).
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form, Congress
decided to limit the practice but little
21
by law.
The Court held that the fact that the employer did not want
the services performed, and that they were not necessary to his
business, were immaterial. The only caution thrown out by the
Court was the statement, "There is no reason to think that sham
can be substituted for substance" 22 under Section 8 (b) (6), but
the Court explained that when the union demand contains a bona
fide offer of competent relevant services, no
unfair labor practice
2 3
has been committed in making the demand.
By dictum, the Court announced that had the musicians'
union continued its former practice of merely requiring the payment of a wage when no service was performed, a violation would
have been committed.
A further facet of the feather-bedding problem arises from
union demands for call-in pay, paid rest periods and vacation pay.
Such demands as these involve cases in which no services are performed, but it seems clear that the demands are lawful in the
light of Senator Taft's explanation in the Senate that demands
of this sort are not "in the nature of an exaction." They are, it
should be noted, demands for payment of wages to employees
whom the employer himself has selected and who regularly perform the work of the business. In neither the American Newspaper Publishers case nor the Gamble Enterprises case did the
majority opinion discuss the meaning of the phrase "in the nature
of an exaction."
The Colorado act as to feather-bedding is again much broader
than Taft-Hartley, and renders it an unfair labor practice to
demand from the employer pay for any employee not required
by him or necessary for his work. Keeping in mind the legislative
history of the feather-bedding provision of Taft-Hartley, it seems
clear, however, that Colorado lacks jurisdiction to apply this provision in any situation affecting interstate commerce.

BACK ISSUES OF DICTA NEEDED
Many law libraries throughout the country now subscribe to
Dicta and bind each volume. The demand for early issues of Dicta
to complete the sets on the shelves of these libraries is heavy.
Especially needed are all issues of the first five volumes which
were published under the name of the Denver Bar Record. We
urge any reader who might be considering the destruction of back
issues of Dicta in connection with an office housecleaning to communicate with the editor at 702 Midland Savings Building in Denver. Arrangements will be made to pick up any accumulation of
back issues which any reader might offer.
- American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. N. L. R. B., supra, n. 19, at
p. 555.
= N. L. R. B. v. Gamble Enterprises, Inc., supra, n. 20, at p. 563.
'3Ibid.
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SECONDARY BOYCOTTS UNDER THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
PHILIP HORNBEIN, JR.

of the Denver Bar

The distinctive feature of a secondary boycott is that it is
directed against a neutral party rather than against the employer
directly involved in the labor dispute. The target of the secondary
boycott is a third party who is engaged in business dealings with
the employer as a customer, supplier, or otherwise. The object
of the secondary boycott is to cause the boycottee to cease doing
business with the employer. The secondary boycott may take the
form of a withholding of either patronage or labor from the boycottee. The withholding of labor may consist of an all-out strike
but is usually confined to a more limited form of work stoppage.
Even before the enactment of recent state and federal legislation restricting labor union activity, the courts were generally
agreed that the secondary boycott was not a permissible weapon
in labor disputes. The courts held that it was contrary to public
policy "to allow the disputants in a particular industrial episode
to conscript neutrals having no relation to either the dispute or
the industry in which it arose." I However, "the economic contest between employer and employee has never concerned merely
the immediate disputants." 2 In every labor dispute, disinterested
persons are affected in one way or another. Almost every strike
will necessarily have an effect upon the operations of customers
and suppliers of the struck employer.
But such indirect repercussions do not convert a primary
strike into illegal secondary activity. It is only where the thrust
of the union activity is aimed directly against the neutral party
that it becomes an unlawful secondary boycott. It is not always
easy to distinguish between the two types of activity. Because
of the complex relationships in our industrial and commercial systems, many border line cases arise which present considerable difficulty to the courts.
Neither federal nor state statutes afford any clear-cut test
for drawing the line between lawful primary activity and unlawful
secondary activity.
The Taft-Hartley law 3 does not restrict secondary boycotts
which take the form of a withholding of patronage. It is only

I Carpenters and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 728, 62 S.
Ct. 807, 810, in which it was held that an injunction against picketing did not invade any constitutional right where the picketing was directed against a restaurant, the owner of which had engaged a contractor employing non-union
labor to construct a building a mile and one-half away from the restaurant.
2

Ibid, 315 U. S. 724, 62 S. Ct. 808.

'29

U.S.C.A., sec. 141, et seq.
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secondary strikes or work stoppages which fall under the ban of
the federal law. Sec. 8 (b) (4) (A) 4 of the Act makes it an unfair
labor practice "to engage in, or to induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike, or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise. handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services,
where an object thereof is . . . forcing or requiring . . . any
employer or other person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with
any other person . . . ". If this section were applied according
to its literal meaning, no strike would be lawful since an object
of every strike is to shut down the employer's operations which
would necessarily force him to "cease doing business" with other
persons. However, the federal courts have quite properly given
little heed to the literal terms of the statute, and have based their
decisions more on the historic concepts of secondary boycotts.
On June 4, 1951, the United States Supreme Court handed
down decisions in four cases 5 involving alleged unlawful secondary boycotts under the Taft-Hartley law.
The first of these cases 6 concerned the picketing of a grain
mill by a union which did not represent a majority of the employees of the mill. The object of the picketing was to gain recognition of the union as bargaining representative of the employees.
The basis of the complaint against the union was an incident
which occurred when a customer's truck, manned by two employees of the customer, approached the mill to pick up a load of
grain. The pickets sought to dissuade the truckers from carrying
out their assignment and to this end they not only employed
rhetoric, but also threw stones at the truck, all to no avail.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had held that an
unfair labor practice had been committed by the union in "attempting to induce and encourage the employees of the neutral
[customer] to refuse to transport . . . the commodities of the
rice mill." 7 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conduct of the union pickets was not covered by Sec. 8 (b) (4) (A) for
two reasons: (1) The picketing was confined to the "geographically restricted area near the mill," and (2) its purpose was not
to induce concerted action by the employees of the neutral employer. In the words of the court, "a union's inducements or encouragements reaching individual employees of neutral employers
U.S.C.A., sec. 158(b) (4) (A).
SN.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Company, 341 U. S. 665, 71 S. Ct.
961; N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U. S.
675, 71 S. Ct. 943; International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. N.L.R.B.,
341 U. S. 694, 71 S. Ct. 954; Local 74, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners of America v. N.L.R.B., 341 U. S. 707, 71 S. Ct. 966.
6
N.L.R.B. v. International Rice Milling Company, supra, n. 5.
7 183 Fed. 2d 21, 26.
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only as they happen to approach the picketed place of business
generally are not aimed at concerted, as distinguished from individual, conduct by such employees." 8 The court said that the fact
that the picketing was restricted to the vicinity of the mill "is
significant, although not necessarily conclusive." 9
Since the Rice Milling case, a number of decisions by the National Labor Relations Board and the federal courts have definitely
established that picketing at the premises of the primary employer
is legal even though it may cause employees of neutral employers
to refuse to perform services for their employers. 10 The United
States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, construed the Rice Milling decision "to mean. that a union may lawfully inflict harm on
a neutral employer, without violating Sec. 8(b) (4), so long as
the harm is merely incidental to a traditionally lawful primary
strike, conducted at the place where the primary employer does
business." 1
But in many cases the employer's operations are mobile, and
the question then arises whether the union may extend its picketing to places remote from the employer's premises. In some industries, the very nature of the employer's business makes it impossible or ineffective to picket the premises of the employer. For
example, in the construction industry, the employer's principal
operations are not conducted in any -central location, but are carried on at numerous project sites. To picket the office or shop of
the contractor would have little effect on his operations. For this
reason, the picketing is usually carried on at the site of the construction work. But in almost every case there are a number of
other contractors also working on the same job, and it is this
situation which gives rise to some of the most difficult problems
under Sec. 8 (b) (4) (A).
On the same day the Supreme Court handed down the'decision in the Rice Milling case, decisions were rendered in three
cases involving picketing in the building and construction industry. In the Denver Building Trades Council case,' 2 the union had
picketed a building project. The general contractor employed
union workers, but one of the sub-contractors employed non-union
workers. The court held the picketing unlawful on the ground
that its object was to force the general contractor to terminate
the contract of the sub-contractor. In the Electrical Workers case, 3
the fact situation was similar to that of the Denver case, and the
court rendered a like decision. However, there is some illuminating language in the opinion of the court which indicates that if
341 U. S. 671, 71 S. Ct. 964.
'341 U. S. 671, 71 S. Ct. 964.
"Pure Oil case, 84 N.L.R.B. No. 38; Ryan Construction Corporation case,
85 N.L.R.B. No. 76; N.L.R.B. v. Service Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen and Helpers Union. (C.A.-2) 191 Fed. (2d) 65.
"341 U. S. 675, 71 S. Ct. 943.
12341 U. S. 694, 71 S. Ct. 954.
U. S. 699, 700, 71 S. Ct. 957.
13341
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the union had proceeded in a slightly different manner, the picketing would have been permissible. The court points out that the
union had made no demands upon the sub-contractor in connection
with the particular project which was picketed. The court further
pointed out:
There are no findings that the picketing was aimed
at Langer [the electrical sub-contractor] to force him
to employ union workmen on this job. On the contrary,
the findings demonstrate that the picketing' was directed
at Deltorto's [the carpentry sub-contractor] employees to
induce them to strike and thus force Deltorto to force
the general 14
contractor to terminate Langer's electrical
sub-contract.
Presumably, if the union had made a demand upon the electrical sub-contractor that he employ union workers on his job,
and had re-worded its picket sign to show that it was directed
against the sub-contractor rather than the general contractor,
there would have been no unfair labor practice.
It is very probable that the practical effect of the picketing
would have been the same if the union had proceeded as suggested
by the court. As it was, the union workers walked off the job
when it was picketed and the general contractor thereupon terminated the contract of the electrical sub-contractor. All this no
doubt would have happened even though the union had followed
the procedure indicated by the court. From this it might seem
that the distinction made by the court is without substance. But
it must be kept in mind that under the provisions of the statute,
picketing is lawful or unlawful depending upon its "object.'' It
is not the effect of the union activity which determines its legality,
but its purpose. What purpose motivates any particular conduct
is always a matter which must be inferred from the circumstances
of the particular case. It may reasonably be expected therefore
that a slight difference in the facts of two cases may produce
divergent results.
In cases involving "roving" picketing, the problem of distinguishing between primary and secondary activity is even more
difficult. The Board has recognized that "in some cases the situs
of the dispute may not be limited to a fixed location; it may be
ambulatory." I In the Schultz Refrigerator Service case 16 the
Board held that the truck upon which a truck driver worked was
the situs of a labor dispute between him and the owner of the
truck. Accordingly, the union to which the driver belonged had
the right to picket the employer's trucks on the premises of the
employer's customers.
In the Moore Dry Dock case 17 the Board formulated a set of
14341

U. S. 699, 700, 71 S. Ct. 957.
"Moore Dry Dock case, 92 N.L.R.B. No. 93.
87 N.L.R.B. No. 82.
"Supra, n. 15.
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tests to determine the legality of picketing away from the premises of the primary employer. Under this decision, picketing at
the premises of a neutral employer is permissible if it meets the
following conditions:
(a) The picketing is strictly limited to times when
the situs of dispute is located on the secondary employer's
premises; (b) at the time of the picketing the primary
employer is engaged in its normal business at the situs;
(c) the picketing is limited to places reasonably close to
the location of the situs; and (d) the picketing discloses
clearly that the dispute is with the primary employer.
These criteria were accepted by the United States Court of Ap-8
peals for the Second Circuit in theService Trade Chauffeurs case.'
All of the cases cited involved some type of work stoppage.
Where the purpose of the picket is to bring about a withholding
of patronage rather than a work stoppage, it would not have to
meet the standards adopted by the Board, since it is only picketing to induce a concerted work stoppage that is restricted by the
Taft-Hartley law. The standards adopted by the Board in the
Moore Dry Dobk case seem to be inconsistent with the position
taken by the Board in the building and construction cases. 19
It is significant that in few of the cases involving alleged
secondary boycotts is the neutral employer the complaining party.
Most of the cases originate upon the complaint of the primary
employer with whom the union is directly engaged in a dispute.
It would seem that the identity of the complaining party should
be given considerable weight in determining whether the thrust
of the union activity is directed against a disinterested bystander
or against the primary employer.
It is unlikely that any workable test or rule will ever be
formulated to clearly mark the dividing line between primary and
secondary union conduct. The most the courts can do is to "reconcile the competing claims of unions to strike and of bystanders
to be free of harm from so-called 'secondary boycotts.' " 20

LITERATE LAWYERS PLEASE NOTE
The editors of Dicta attempt to fill forty pages of each issue
with material which is of interest to Colorado lawyers. This is
frequently a difficult task since we are dependent upon our readers
for contributions of the articles or items used and lawyers are
prone to be too modest of their literary prowess. One need only
be literate to transcribe for his fellow lawyers and posterity in
Dicta anecdotes, amusing incidents and other items of interest.
Many briefs which lawyers prepare on Colorado law would make
excellent articles for Dicta. Contributions are always solicited.
"Supra, n. 10.
19Supra, n. 5.
2 N.L.R.B. v. Service
Trade Chauffeurs, Salesmen and Helpers Union,
(C.A.-2) 191 Fed. 2d 65.
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THE RIGHT TO WORK
KENNETH R. WHITING *

One of the most controversial issues that has followed in the
wake of organized labor's phenomenal rise to a position of eminence during and since the war has centered around the much
debated right to work legislation. Although the American worker
has probably felt that he was heir to the right to pursue the
occupation of his choice since the yoke of English colonialism
was first discarded, there has been no positive manifestation of
the right in legislation and court decisions until the last decade.
Until then it was merely a privilege that nebulously but omnipresently enveloped a people who, though suspicious of fetters,
are often too smug in their freedom. The industrial revolution
and collective security notwithstanding, a few were still confident
that the right was theirs when the gasping phantom that once
was King Industry and his strange new bedfellow, the individualistic toiler, sought to rouse it from its slumber to rescue the embattled bastions of free enterprise from the new ogre of the Sunday editorial pages, organized labor.
Congress turned a deaf ear to the rumbling from without, jbut
the halls of sundry state assemblies, which echoed the croaking
when it became a local clamor, rushed to the rescue in the name
of the public health, wealth, and welfare.
The result to date of the inevitable backswing of the pendulum
is that thirteen states have constitutional amendments or legislation passed with the purpose of curtailing union security. Florida
passed a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right to
work in 1944. Since then Arizona, Arkansas, Nebraska, and
South Dakota have followed suit. Legislation accomplishing approximately the same result has been passed in Georgia, Iowa,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia.
Although all of the states' laws are not identical in detail,
the one major provision that no person shall be denied employment because of non-membership in a labor union or organization
may be found in all of the legislation.
Some of the acts define the meaning of a labor union or organization. Most of them specifically outlaw provisions in contracts
entered into by employers and unions that make union membership compulsory.
A violation of the act is made a misdemeanor punishable by
fine and imprisonment by most of the laws. Enforcement by injunction is afforded in four states' and an action for damages
is given to any person who is refused employment
because of
2
non-membership in a union in three states.
Student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Arizona, Georgia, Iowa and South Dakota.
2 Arizona, North Carolina and Virginia.
*
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According to a recent survey by the Missouri State Chamber
of Commerce, 3 the right-to-work laws of the thirteen states have
not proven uniformly practicable in actual application. Based
on the opinions of the labor commissioners of the various states,
it would appear that the acceptance of the laws so far as evidenced by public opinion and court litigation runs the gamut from
wholehearted support to grudging, temporary acquiescence. It
is undoubtedly too early in the respective and collective history
of the acts to gauge their effectiveness and feasibility. In some
states the legislation has had the expected opposition from labor,
and in others the attitude on the part of both labor and management seems to be one of cautious acceptance. No information on
the decrease of union shop clauses in contracts involving purely
intrastate industries in the thirteen states is available at this time.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the right-to-work
laws of Nebraska and North Carolina on just about every count
upon which they might be challenged in 1949. 4 Justice Black
spoke for the court in an opinion in which it was held that they
do not abridge freedom of speech, the right to assembly does not
include the right to drive others from employment, they do not
unconstitutionally impair obligations of contract, they do not
deny equal protection under the law to unions as against employers and non-union workers, they do not deny liberty without due
process of law and they are not without the domain of legitimate
state powers if not in opposition to federal law. Justice .Frankfurter stated that it should be up to the voters of the individual
states to have the final decision in such legislation. The desirability
of such restrictions on union security was not passed on by the
court, because it felt that such was a political question.
The Taft-Hartley Act does not exclusively occupy the field
in its entirety. It does outlaw the closed shop while permitting
the union shop. 5 The Act further provides:6
Nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing
the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any state territory in which such execution
is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
In light of the pertinent provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act
and the decisions by the United States Supreme Court in 1949,
it appears that any argument pro or con that is directed to the
advisability of such legislation must be confined to the field of
desirable political action.
Experts (both legitimate and otherwise) have waxed hot and
eloquent in debates over the rejuvenated corpse of the individual
See "State Protection of the Right to Work," W. R. Brown, Labor Law
Journal. Jan. 1953, p. 32.
'Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern Iron and Metal
Co., 385 U. S. 525; Algona Plywood and Veneer Co. v. W. E. R. B., 336 U. S. 301.
Sec. 8(a) (3), Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended in 1951.
6Sec. 14(b), Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.
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working man in their zealous attempt to espouse or disclaim his
right to work. Some have likened compulsory union membership
to the yellow dog contract.7 One of the oracles has prophesied
that the inevitable result of union shop contracts will be a totalitarian state." The issue has been defined as one in which "America
is at the crossroads, (because) to freedom-loving people it means
the closed shop and compulsory unionism." 9
It has been said that the unions are attempting to establish
an extra-constitutional pseudo-political status in their fight for
the union shop. This is apparently based on an analogy between
their attempt to exact dues and the power to tax, which has always
been reserved to the state. It has also been said that the claim
that this right is necessary to give strength and stability to the
union is merely to plead expediency and to confess the failure of
the union to win democratic support. 10
Many feel that such a limitation upon the individual's right
to work where he can find employment will lead to the undermining of our democracy. To bolster their contention that this right
is a "primary" right and not subordinate to the right to organize
and bargain collectively, they point with righteous indignation to
America's "spirit of democracy" and our "sense of fair play."
To further confuse the issue they quote ambiguous dicta from
U. S. Supreme Court decisions that are hardly relevant and that
were never intended to be stare decisis on the point at issue. 1
Since much of the criticism directed toward the union shop
is tinged or pervaded with rank emotionalism, it is difficult to
separate the chaff from the wheat. In no other sphere of the
gargantuan struggle between management and labor is it as necessary to discard the emotional surplusage and to pierce to the core
of the matter before the parties in particular and the public in
general can give direction and purpose to their myriad and often
conflicting views.
The proponents of right-to-work legislation have, to the
author's way of thinking, one (and only one) argument that can
be forceably submitted and maintained. This is the often repeated
charge of monopoly by unions. The statement that compulsory
union membership is espoused by labor in contradistinction to the
basic right to work is not supported by union activity, state or

'"Union

Shop in the Steel Crises," Rev. Jerome L. Toner, Labor Law

Journal, Vol. 3, p. 589.

I Benjamin Fairless, in a radio address, "Your Stake in the Steel Crises,"
April 6, 1952, p. 9.
Clarence B. Randal, in a radio address, "These Are the Facts, Mr. President," p. 9.
"See "The Right to Work," George Rose, Labor Law Journal, Vol. 1, pp.
293, 295.
"An excellent, recent example of misquoting cited the following:
The very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or means
of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails,
as being the essence of slavery. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
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federal laws, or judicial precedent. The union shop does not require compulsory membership, although it may require the paying of dues on the part of the worker to help bear the cost of the
activity which has played such a prodigious part in his economic
and social advancement in the past. The Taft-Hartley Act does
not require union membership. There are no court decisions in
point that set down an unqualified right on the part of the American citizen to pursue the occupation of his choice or to sell his
labor on his own terms.
The principle that the union shop agreement gives the union
a monopoly can be met with equally convincing arguments to the
contrary. The best rebuttal can be simply stated by declaring
that those unions that have had the benefit of union shop clauses
in their contracts in the past have not enjoyed a monopolistic
control over the supply of labor or over wages, hours, and conditions of work. The employer has been free to hire and fire employees as long as he did not thereby "discriminate to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization." 12 The
monopoly control over wages, hours, and conditions of work has
never come from, and cannot come from, the union shop clause
in a labor-management contract. This control, which never has
merited the epithet "monopolistic", came solely and exclusively
from the legal collective-bargaining agreement and not from any
union shop clause in any contract.
There is no reason to suspect that this will not continue in
the future as it has in the past. To the author, it is inconceivable
that this fact, as evidenced by past experience, could ever be otherwise in the future.
Thus, the right-to-work legislation that has so far been passed
is not directed toward the tool of organized labor that most merits
the charge of monopoly, the collective-bargaining power. The
American myth to the effect that the individual worker has the
unalienable right to work when, where, and on such terms as he
may wish is true only where there is no collective-bargaining agreement. The irrefutable truth of this statement has been
recognized
13
and given eloquent expression by judicial tribunals.
In passing I might comment that although the collective-bargaining agreement might constitute a monopolistic control of hours,
wages, and conditions of work, it is a majority monopoly that
follows the time-honored principle of majority rule. "The importance of the broad public purpose sought to be served justifies
the means employed." 14
It should be remembered that the right to join a union is not
the same thing as the right not to join a union. Nor is the right
not to join a union, if it exists, the same thing as the right to
reap the benefits of concerted action without meeting its attendant
12

Sec. 8 (a) (3), N.L.R.A.

"'J. I. Case Company v. N. L. R. B., 321 U.S. 322 (1944).
4 National

Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146 (1948).

Aug., 1953

DICTA

individual obligations. Critics of the union shop would do well
to remember that federal law compels every union that legally
represents the majority of the employees in a valid bargaining
unit to expend its time and money to obtain and retain rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment and conditions of work for employees working under the contract who will not join the union
in equality with those who have joined the union. Why can it be
said that it is unjust or inequitable to legally force and compel
those same non-union employees to at least offer to bear a fair
share of the cost of maintenance of the union that must work for
all alike?
In the last analysis, the controversy centering around rightto-work legislation resolves itself into the problem of balancing
conflicting rights. Those reasonable restraints on the rights of
liberty and property that the common weal and general welfare
demand include the union shop. The author submits that the
right-to-work legislation is a wholly arbitrary and ineffective
deterrant to whatever monopolistic activities that organized labor
may be guilty of practicing. The author further submits that
unions should not be compelled to expend their time and money
for the benefit of non-union employees without the correlative
right of contribution from those who refuse to join their ranks
through either justifiable principle or dogged recalcitrance.
The unalienable right to work cannot be found in either the
natural law of our social, economic, and political web or the constitutional and legislative canons that theoretically reflect the
mores of the citizenry. Some who in the not so distant past were
quick to tread upon the hand and spirit of the laboring man suddenly feel the clarion call to rescue him from the tentacles of the
one institution that has so effectively espoused his cause. Some
more cynical than the author might suspect that their motives
are not entirely charitable.

CASE COMMENTS
LABOR LAW: DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYER BECA.USE OF UNION ACTIVITY-The ruling of the Colorado Industrial Commission, which was upheld by the district court, was
affirmed by the Supreme Court when it ordered Bennett's Restaurant to offer reemployment and compensation for financial loss
to four waitresses who were discharged in violation of the Colorado Labor Peace act.' The court ruled that the waitresses were
selected for discharge because of their union activity and to intimidate other employees from joining the union.
Bennett's Restaurant v. Industrial Commission, (March 23, 1953) Colorado
Bar Association Advance Sheet for March 28, 1953.
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Petitioner claimed his reason for discontinuing the breakfast
shift and firing four waitresses was to reduce business expense.
The Industrial Commission did not decide on this issue, but the
Supreme Court accepted it as true. The primary question decided
was whether petitioner selected the four waitresses to be discharged on some legitimate ground, such as incompetence, or because they joined the Hotel and Restaurant Employees union,
A. F. of L.
The facts of the case make it fairly obvious that the four
waitresses were discharged for their union activity. They were
the only four who signed union cards when the union organizer
visited the restaurant, and they talked to other employees urging
them to join. The manager's assertion that they were discharged
because of discontinuance of the breakfast shift was refuted by
a showing that one of the women fired was on the afternoon
shift two women on the breakfast shift were retained, and other
waitresses were hired before and after the firing.
Petitioner also claimed that a list was made of "outstanding"
waitresses and none of the waitresses fired was on that list. However, this claim lost weight when the manager admitted that
some waitresses who were on the "outstanding" list had been
working for Bennett's less than a week, before their competence
could be determined.
The Colorado Labor Peace act 2 provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
individually or in concert with others: to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization, employee agency, committee, association or representation
plan by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure or
other terms or conditions of employment. ..
Subsections 7 and 8 of Section 8 provide that when the -commission's order is reviewed by a district court "The findings of fact
made by the Commission, if supported by creditable and competent-evidence in the record, shall be conclusive." It is the province of the commission and not of the court to determine the
weight to be accorded to the evidence.
For the rule of evidence to be applied in labor cases heard
before commissions, the Supreme Court cites 56 C.J.S. 307, Section 28 (100)
In ascertaining whether an employee was discharged
because of union activities the board may consider circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence, but when circumstantial evidence is relied on there must be evidence of
circumstances from which the board may conclude with
reasonable certainty that the employee was discharged
because of union activity. The board may draw infer"-Colo. Laws, chap. 131, sec. 6, p. 400 (1943).
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ences from the facts proved. The fact that some of the
evidence relating to a discriminatory discharge was hearsay affords no basis for objecting to the finding of the
board. However, mere suspicions or conjecture alone is
not sufficient on which to base a finding of discriminatory discharge.
The district and Supreme Courts held that the findings of the
commission, that petitioner discriminated against employees who
sought unionization for the restaurant, were supported by "creditable and competent evidence" even though it was circumstantial.
Interpreting the Colorado Labor Peace act, the court quotes
language from N. L. R. B. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation:3
The act (NLRA) does not interfere with the normal
exercise of the right of the employer to select its employees or to discharge them. The employer may not,
under cover of that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with respect to their self-organization and representation and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to make its authority a pretext for interference
with the right of discharge when that right is exercised
for other reasons than such intimidation and coercion.
This case appears to be the first decision by the Colorado
Supreme Court interpreting the Colorado Labor Peace Act on
the issue of whether circumstantial evidence is admissible to prove
that an employee was discharged for his union activity.
The case points up how far labor unions have progressed in
Colorado in their efforts to win recognition since the early 1900's
when violence dominated the coal fields of Southern Colorado
when the United Mine Workers sought to unionize the mines. The
unions first achieved recognition after the strikes of 1914 when
the Rockefeller plan was put into effect in all Colorado Fuel and
Iron Company mines. The company reserved the right to hire
and fire "with fairness of the action subject to review," but it
was agreed that union membership was not
a reason for refusing
4
a miner employment or discharging him.
DOLORES KoPLOWITZ.

1301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4 Out of the Depths by Barron B. Beshoar (1942).
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DIVISION OF PROPERTY IN SEPARATE
MAINTENANCE
MARIAN E. LOW*

Sec. 28, Chap. 56, Colo. Stat. Ann., provides inter alia as
follows:
• . . the court . . . may make reasonable orders for
temporary support, suit money or counsel fees . . . and
may, upon the entry of the decree of separate maintenance, make such permanent orders, or may, in the
proper case, determine the property rights of the parties
or decree a division of property upon such terms and
conditions as the court shall deem just.
Should the "or" in each instance in the above quoted section
be read in the disjunctive, i.e., either support payments or a
division of property, or should it be read in the conjunctive so
as to allow both which is permitted in divorce decreesI by such
a construction? 2 There is no Colorado decision directly in point
answering this question.
It is the writer's contention that to give the wife both support money and a division of property under a separate maintenance decree would be contrary to the underlying concept of
separate maintenance, and would be treating it as a divorce to
the extent that the property rights of the parties are affected
thereby.
Under the common law, if the husband failed or refused to
support his wife, she could buy necessaries upon his credit, if
she were able to find a tradesman who was willing to sell to her
on such precarious terms. All agreements for a separation were
void as against public policy because they were in derogation of
the marriage relationship. 3 It is apparent that the common law
remedy afforded to the wife was grossly inadequate.
When the ecclesiastical courts first devised the equitable remedy of alimony, the husband was called upon 4to support the wife,
but only when she had no means of support.
The prevailing modern view is summarized in one of the
present day encyclopedias as follows:5
The purpose of a suit for separate maintenance is
to enforce specifically the general duty of the husband
to support the wife by obtaining an order or decree directing certain definite payments to be made at regular
intervals for this purpose.
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.

'Colo. Stat. Ann., Sec. 8, Chap. 56 (1935).
2 Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 117 P. 2d 363 (1946).
14 Madden, Domestic Relations, Sec. 99.
O'Neil v. O'Neil, 18 N. J. Misc. 82, 11 A. 2d 128 (1939).

642 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 614.
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In Coe v. Coe, a Massachusetts case, the court said, "Allowance to the wife is made in recognition of the legal right of the
wife to be supported by her husband solely for the purpose of
providing for her support, and not for the purpose of a division
of their property or the husband's property." 0
In granting a division of the property in addition to the
regular payments, the court would be ignoring the fact that "although a legal separation has been decreed, the marital relationship still exists. It (decree) anticipates that a future reconciliation may be brought about." ' If the husband should die with
such a decree in effect, the wife still retains her legal status as
the spouse, for separate maintenance does not change the course
of inheritance. Thus the wife would benefit twice from a division
of the husband's property if the court had allowed such a division
at the time of the separate maintenance decree.
The benefits of the separate maintenance decree should not
be so large as to render separation attractive to the wife." The
decree differs from alimony in that ordinarily it is only temporary
relief for the present needs of the wife. 9 The purpose is not to enrich the wife, but to provide suitable support and maintenance for
her, taking into consideration the manner in which she was accustomed to live with her husband and the husband's ability to
provide support.'0
PROVISIONS IN OTHER STATES

It might be instructive at this point to consider a highlighted
survey of other jurisdictions, to determine if the prevailing view
tends to support our contention. It would be helpful if there
were one state with a statute on separate maintenance the same
as Colorado's but such is not the case. There is a wide divergence
in the provisions of the various jurisdictions, ranging from one
extreme to the other.
Kansas is the one state that clearly permits a division of
the property and an adjudication of the property rights at the
time of the legal separation." As early as 1900,12 the Kansas Supreme Court stated that the division or disposition of the property, and the relinquishment by one of any claim or interest,
actual or contingent, in the estate of the other by reason of the
marital relationship,, in a separate maintenance decree was not
contrary to public policy. The court has consistently followed this
theory. 13 Kansas obviously does not follow the theory that there
will be a future reconciliation, but that at the time of the separa1313 Mass 232, 46 N.E. 2d 1017 (1943).
' Decker v. Decker, 56 Mont. 338, 185 P. 168 (1919).
'Rhodes v. Rhodes, 92 N. J. Eq. 252, 114 A. 414 (1920).
9 Rhodes v. Rhodes, supra, note No. 8.
"Reeve v. Reeve, Mo. App., 160 S. W. 2d 804 (1942).
"General Statutes of Kansas Annotated, Art. 15, Sec. 60-1506, 1516 (1935).
1" King v. Mollohan, 61 Kan. 683, 60 P. 731
(1900).
"aE.G., Hardesty v. Hardesty, 115 Kan. 192, 222 P. 102 (1924); Wulf v.
Fitzpatrick, 124 Kan. 642, 261 P. 838 (1927).
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tion, because of health, religious factors, age or obstinacy, there
will never be a divorce; that the separation is permanent. Therefore, a division of the property would seem only equitable to the
wife. It is also notable that there is an unusually large number
of separate maintenance actions brought in Kansas.
California also permits a division of property by the court
according to this section: "
. . The court in granting the husband or wife permanent support and maintenance of himself or
herself shall make the same disposition of the community property . . . as would have been made if the marriage had been
dissolved." 14 Sec. 146 of the Cicil Code provides that at the
dissolution of a marriage, the community property shall be equally
divided.
In spite of the above clear language which permits the court
to adjudicate property rights at the rendition of separate
mainte15
nance decrees, the court said in Blache v. Blache:
If the action is one for separation and maintenance,
a dissolution is not contemplated, the parties remain as
before, husband and wife. The rights of the wife in the
community property are not destroyed by the decree for
maintenance unless there is an agreed property settlement or the court awards the community property in accordance with the statutes. In a maintenance action,
periodical payments, not an absolute allowance are ordinarily contemplated, though the court has the right to
order otherwise.
Thus, even the court with clear authority to divide the property
indicates it ordinarily would not want to do so.
Two other community property states, Idaho and Washington,
do not allow division because there is no statutory authority to
do so. 16 The Idaho court pointed out that Idaho had no statute
similar to California's and reversed a lower court decree which
gave the wife all the property real and personal, both community
8
and separate. 17 The Washington court in Cummings v. Cummings"
upheld the separate maintenance decree but denied the division of
the community property. The court said: "The courts do not have
the power to dispose of community property when granting a
decree of separate maintenance but the extent of their jurisdiction is to impose liens to secure the payment of any award which
may be made."
The Illinois statute seems to be a more typical separate maintenance provision.' 9 It provides for an award for reasonable sup' California Civil Code, Sec. 137.
1'Blache v. Blache, 69 Cal. 2d 616, 160 P. 2d 136 (1945).
' Idaho Civil Code, Sec. 14-103.301 (1932); Washington Rem. Rev. Stat.,
Sec. 6890.
"'Radermacher v. Radermacher, 59 Ida. 716, 87 P. 2d 461 (1939).
IsCummings v. Cummings, 20 Wash. 2d 703, 149 P. 2d 155 (1944).
"Smith-Hurd Stat., Chap. 68, Sec. 22 (1935).
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port and maintenance while husband and wife live apart. The
court is to take into consideration the condition in life of the parties at the place and residence of the wife or husband, and the
circumstances of the respective cases. There is no mention of
an adjudication of property or power to settle property rights.
However, there are some Illinois cases where the property
was divided. In Decker v. Decker property rights were settled
on the theory that the husband had abandoned the wife without
her fault. 20 In Cox v. Cox, the court said that the property of the
the husband could bear the burden of providing for support of
his wife, where he had left the state. 21 In the Ribegard case the
court stated that the usual rule was that property rights should
not be adjusted, but in this case the parties themselves asked for
an adjudication.22 These various exceptions illustrate how the
Colorado statute could be applied if the "ors" were construed in
the alternative. Where the husband is not available to provide
support or has no income or ability to work, then if he has property it should be made available for the wife's support. This
construction also gives some meaning to the Colorado statutory
language "in the proper case."
The Ohio statute 23 provides inter alia, that the court is allowed to give alimony out of H's property, as is equitable which
may be allowed in real or personal property, or both, payable
either in gross or installments. In a 1922 case 24 the court would
not decree a division of property on the basis that there might
be future reconciliation. In 1933 25 the court would not give the
wife one car in addition to periodic payments when the husband
had two, saying the car was not necessary for her reasonable
support. In 1949 26 in refusing a property division the court recognized that in a suit for alimony alone, the court is much more
limited than in a divorce case. In a very recent case, 27 when the
lower court had awarded the wife ninety dollars a week and
ordered the husband to transfer one-half interest in the family
dwelling to the wife, the Supreme Court sustained the decree,
and stated:
Sec. 11998 clearly provides that in granting separate
support to the wife the court may allow alimony payable
in real or personal property. . . . Here the court granted,
as alimony, the husband's one-half interest in the family
dwelling as well as weekly payments of money. Such
-279 Ill. 300, 116 N.E. 688 (1917).
- 192 Ill. App. 286 (1916).
21Ribegard v. Ribegard, 349 Ill. App. 99, 110 N.E. 2d 89 (1953).
23 Pages Ohio General Code, Sec. 11998.
24 Durham v. Durham, 104 Ohio St. 7, 135 N.E. 280.
25 Daily v. Daily, 48 Ohio App. 83, 192 N.E. 287.
24Neal
v. Neal, Ohio Com. Pl., 85 N.E. 2d 147 (1949).
' Glassman v. Glassman, Ohio App., 103 N.E. 2d 781 (1951).

314

DICTA

Aug., 1953

an award is not a division of the property as claimed by
defendant. Unquestionably, the court found that providing the wife the right to the family dwelling as a
place to live was more desirable than increasing the money
award to provide for housing of the family elsewhere.
Michigan, 28 Kentucky, 29 and Tennessee 0 seemed to have had
this situation in view for by their respective statutes the wife is
allowed the use and possession of the husband's property although
not title to it. To illustrate: in Michigan in 1951,'1 Mrs. Mackie
was awarded $300 per month and the use of the home owned
jointly, with Mr. Mackie paying the taxes and insurance. The
court said, "In a statutory proceeding for separate maintenance
the courts do not award the wife title to any of the husband's
property. In determining a proper allowance for the wife, the
court should take into consideration the husband's income, the
age and health of both parties, the station in life, and manner of
living of the parties prior to the separation."
Some of the other states which do not allow a division of
property at the time of the separate maintenance decree are:
Massachusetts 2 Florida, 33 Maryland 4 New Hampshire, 35 West Virginia, 31 and Montana.3 The Montana court said, "a reconciliation
may be effected, and the marital relations resumed, and any decree which is made is subject to alteration or modification any
time. To sustain a division of property would put it beyond the
power of the court to make any further order in respect to the
property."
Although the decisions by the courts of the other jurisdictions do not have any application to separate maintenance actions
in Colorado, since the matter is governed by statute, they do
reflect, for the most part, an attitude that conforms to the underlying principle that separate maintenance entitles the wife to
reasonable support only, and does not warrant both support and
a division of the property.
CONCLUSION

At the outset the question was raised as to whether the "ors"
in Sec. 28 should be read in the conjunctive or the disjunctive.
The author has attempted to show that because of the basic concept of separate maintenance, and the views expressed by the
other jurisdictions, they should be read in the disjunctive.
'Michigan Compiled Laws, Sees. 552.301, 552.302 (1948).
Kentucky Revised Statutes, Sec. 403.060.
' Williams Tennessee Code Anno., Sec. 8446 (1934).
2

Mackie v. Mackie, 329 Mich. 595, 46 N.W. 2d 393 (1951).
Dunnington v. Dunnington, 324 Mass. 610, 87 N.E. 2d 847

Lamoureaux v. Lamoureaux, Fla., 25 So. 2d 859 (1946).
S Nicodemus v. Nicodemus, 120 Md. 584, 48 A. 2d 442 (1946).
4

Pflug v. Pflug, 92 N.H. 247, 47 A. 2d 829 (1946).
'Davis v. Davis, W. Va. 70 S.E. 2d 889 (1952).

11Decker v. Decker, 56 Mont. 338, 185 P. 168 (1919).

(1949).
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Any doubt cast on our opinion would come from an attorney
for a wife who wanted a division of the property in addition to
periodic payments in a separate maintenance action, and who
relied on the case of Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115 Colo. 505, 117 P. 2d
363, a 1946 case in which the court construed the divorce section,
Sec. 8, Chap. 56, 35 C. S. A. This section provides for the court
to decree alimony "or" a division of the property. The court held
that the conjunction "or" should be construed synonymous with
"and" so that payments or alimony, and a division of property
could be made. The court stated: "There is nothing to indicate
that the legislative intent was to restrict the court or give its
authority only in the alternative. It appears rather to indicate
an intent specifically to grant full authority in the court to make
just provision for the wife and children."
Because of the inherent difference between the action for
divorce and separate maintenance, it is the feeling of this writer
that this construction should be limited in it application to Sec. 8
and not applied to Sec. 28. Divorce is final; separate maintenance
is not. The marital relationship is not over and ended and the
court should not treat the property as if it were.
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